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THE EXHAUSTION RULE AND HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEDURE: THE PLAIN STATEMENT SOLUTION
- A LONG TIME COMING
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Historical Context
The prisoner's right to challenge the legality of his detention,
habeas corpus, was established by the Romans.' Literally translated,
it means "you have the body"; Roman law required that "the indi-
vidual must be publicly exhibited, that is produced,"' and then
judged. Common law habeas corpus can be traced to the Magna
Carta which stated that "no freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned
• . .excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of
the land." 8 King John "broke the charter immediately afterwards,
0 1987 by Thomas G.F. Del Beccaro
1. W. CHURCH, A TREATISE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 2 (1886). A TREA-
TISE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is an extensive developmental history of habeas
corpus procedure in England and the United States. For additional discussions of habeas
corpus history, see R. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. Albany 1870) (1st ed. Albany 1858) (Hurd provides
an exhaustive study of the early history of habeas corpus and its application in American law);
R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1969) (The author extensively chronicles the
procedural history of habeas corpus); Rosenn, The Great Writ - A Reflection of Societal
Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1983) (the author discusses how social change has influenced
the growth and decline of Federal Habeas Corpus); Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: An Argument For a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393
(1983) (the author presents a detailed overview of the exhaustion rule).
2. W. CHURCH, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Id. The 29th section of the Magna Carta reads in full: "No free man shall be seized,
or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way destroyed; Nor will we condemn
him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the
laws of the land." Church further notes that:
Prior to the signing of the charter of King John, however, other writs for liber-
ating persons from prison on certain criminal charges were in existence.
Glanville, the earliest English law-writer, who composed his treatises in the
reign of Henry II., 1154-1189, details the particulars of a writ called De odio et
atia which was used for this purpose. Other ancient writs were devised for
personal liberty, as particularly those called De homine replegiando and De
manucaptione capienda. Subsequently to the signing of the great charter, all
these gradually gave place to more summary and efficacious writ[s] of habeas
corpus. This last-named writ, requiring a return of the body of the person im-
prisoned, and the cause of his detention, and hence anciently called Corpus cum
causa, was in familiar use between subject and subject in the reign of Henry
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[but nevertheless] it formed a basis for hundreds of years on which
prisoners unlawfully confined could ground their demand for
liberty." 4
In the United States, the right to habeas corpus is grounded in
article I, section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution which states that
"[the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it." In practice, the federal writ of habeas corpus subjects
all detentions that violate the Constitution to federal judicial review.'
VI., 1422-1461. It was apparently used as a means of relief from private re-
straint, and at that period it seems to have been familiar to and well understood
by the judges. But its use by the subject against the crown has not been traced
during the time of the Plantagenet dynasty; the earliest precedents known com-
mencing with the reign of the Tudors, in the times of Henry VII., 1485-1509.
From this time on, the use of the habeas corpus became more frequent, and
before the act of 31 Car.ll. it had become an admitted constitutional remedy -
probably as early as the reign of Charles 1., 1625-1649.
Id. at 3-4.
4. Id. at 3. Many historians judge the legal development of a society and/or the scope of
that society's freedom by whether habeas corpus is or was an established right. See, e.g., 9
DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION 105 (1965).
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cI. 2.
6. Leff, Clarification of the "Fairly Presented" Exhaustion Requirement: An Intelligi-
ble Standard for Prisoners, Practitioners, and Judges - Daye v. Attorney General of New
York, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc), on remand, 712 F.2d 1566 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984) (citing Payton v. Rowe, [sic) 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968)), 56 TEMP.
L.Q. 1073, 1074 (1983) [hereinafter "Fairly Presented" Exhaustion Requirement]. The gen-
eral rules regarding post-conviction procedure are as follows:
lA~n application for post-conviction relief must be made in the county or district
where the applicant was convicted [See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982)); an indi-
gent applicant is entitled to the appointment of counsel [See e.g., UNIF. POST-
CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 5 ("If the applicant is unable to pay court
costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing and legal
services, these costs and expenses shall be made available to the applicant in the
preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on review."]; and, if
needed, to a free transcript [See Bozeman v. United States, 354 F. Supp 1262
(1973)]; there is no particular time within which the application must be made
[See e.g., 28 U.S.C., § 2255 (1982) ("[A] motion . . . for such relief may be
made at any time..."]; a ground for relief which was knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waived may not be asserted [(See e.g., ARIZ. CT. C.P.R.,
32.2(a)(3)]; the judge who presided at the original trial may be allowed to pass
upon the application [See e.g., UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 7
("The application shall be heard in, and before any judge of, the court in which
the conviction took place . . .")]; a hearing is necessary only if there exists a
material issue of fact [See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982)1; if a hearing is held,
the court may receive evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions, or oral
testimony, the applicant has the burden of proof, and the court must make spe-
cific findings of fact and conclusions of law [See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982)
("Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be
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The federal writ was originally available only to federal prisoners,'
but in 1867 it was extended to state prisoners.' At present any con-
stitutional violation may warrant a challenge,9 whereas only a lack
served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto .. ")]; the court may, but need not, allow the applicant to be present,
lSee e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) ("A court may entertain and determine such
motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.")]; al-
though it should allow him to be present if there exists a material issue of fact
as to evidence in which he participated [See e.g., IDAHO CT. C.P.R., § 19-
4907(b) ("The applicant should be produced at the hearing on a motion attack-
ing a sentence when there are substantial issues of fact as to evidence in which
he participated. The sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the
claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing anal requiring the
applicant to be present.")]; all grounds for relief available to the applicant must
be raised in his application, and any ground not so raised will be deemed
waived and may not be the basis for a subsequent application unless the court
finds a sufficient reason for the failure earlier to assert it [See e.g., UNIF. POST-
CONVICTION Acr § 8 ("All grounds for relief available to an applicant under
this Act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application.
Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence
or in any other proceeding, the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be
the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised
in the original, supplemental, or amended application.")]; and an appeal may be
taken from the court's decision to the appropriate appellate court [See e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) ("An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from
the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a
writ of habeas corpus .... ")].
Although it ordinarily intended that a comprehensive post-conviction rem-
edy be exclusive, broadening and displacing such remedies as habeas corpus and
coram nobis, it is not intended that the new remedy be a substitute for routine
post-trial motions or for appeal. Indeed, the traditional remedy of habeas corpus
may still be available to test the legality of detentions as to which the new rem-
edy would be inapplicable, inadequate, or ineffective." [See e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (1982)).
4 F. WHARTON & C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 646, at 382 (12th ed.
1974) [hereinafter WHARTON & TORCIA].
7. JUDICIARY ACT OF SEPTEMBER 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982)).
8. HABEAS CORPUS ACT OF 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)).
9. Ryan, Rose v. Lundy: The Supreme Court Adopts the Total Exhaustion Rule for
Review of Mixed Habeas Corpus Petitions, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 859, 863 (citing Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963)); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The grounds for post-conviction
relief are generally as follows:
[Tihe remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis have come to be broadened in
scope and, in some jurisdictions, have come to be consolidated into a single com-
prehensive post-conviction remedy. Typically, the following grounds for post-
conviction relief may be asserted: (1) That the conviction or sentence was viola-
tive of the constitution or laws of the state or of the United States; (2) that the
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of state jurisdiction sufficed initially.10 Today, it is probably still fair
to say, as the Supreme Court did in Frank v. Mangum" in 1915,
that it is the federal judiciary's role "to look beyond forms and in-
quire into the very substance of the matter, to the extent of deciding
whether the prisoner has been deprived of his liberty without due
process of law." 2 As this comment will point out, however, recent
decisions regarding the exhaustion rule and other aspects of habeas
corpus procedure have cast a long shadow over that view.
B. The Exhaustion Rule
The Exhaustion Rule requires the "fair presentation""3 of a pe-
titioner's "claim" for habeas relief, absent extenuating circumstances,
to the state courts prior to federal court presentation. The rule was
developed to aid the federal and state courts in "cooperat[ing] as har-
monious members of a judicial system."' 4 As the number of petitions
for habeas corpus relief increased over time, efficiency joined federal/
state comity as an Exhaustion Rule goal. 5 However, Exhaustion
Rule application has met with difficulty. Two distinct problems
hamper habeas corpus procedure: 1) imprecise standards of review,
and 2) lack of communication between state and federal courts.
The first of those problems stems from the fact that the terms
"fair presentation, "claim" and "factual allegation" are used incon-
court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence; (3) that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; (4) that certain ma-
terial facts not previously presented warrant vacation of the conviction or sen-
tence; (5) that the sentence has expired; (6) that probation or parole was unlaw-
fully revoked; (7) that a law which led to the applicant's conviction or sentence
has been changed and the law as changed may be applied retroactively; and (8)
that the applicant is otherwise unlawfully held in custody, or that the conviction
or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground heretofore
available under writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common-
law or statutory remedy (See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255). But an ordinary error or
irregularity in the course of trial, or a defense such as insanity, the statute of
limitations, or former jeopardy may not be asserted as a ground for post-convic-
tion relief. Indeed, no question going merely to the guilt or innocence of a de-
fendant may be considered in a post-conviction proceeding.
WHARTON & TORCIA, supra note 6, § 647, at 390.
10. Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 106 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1862).
11. 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
14. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886) (citing Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 583, 595 (1857)). The defendant in Taylor instituted an action for replevin in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The jurisdictional issue arose because the defendant sought
the invalidation of an attachment proceeding based on an alleged improper jurisdictional grant.
15. See infra notes 106-38 and accompanying text.
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sistently.1 The most vivid example of that inconsistent application is
the Fifth Circuit case of Vela v. Estelle" and its appeal to the Su-
preme Court in McKaskle v. Vela."8
In Vela v. Estelle," the petitioner presented the same claim and
factual record at the state and federal levels."' However, he enumer-
ated several factual allegations in his federal petition that were not
enumerated in his state petition."' The Fifth Circuit found that the
petitioner "fairly presented his claim" to the state courts.2 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Vela was denied certiorari, but not
without strong disapproval by Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger.'8 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that
the Fifth Circuit's standard for "fair presentation" was incorrect."
Her difference of opinion stems at least in part from the fact that the
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court use different definitions for
"claim" and "factual allegations."" As a result of the strong dissent
in Vela and the denial of certiorari, the precise standard for "fair
presentation" and the definitions of "claim" and "factual allegation"
in the habeas corpus context remain unresolved.
The second problem plaguing habeas corpus procedure is that
state court opinions rarely, if ever, explicitly state which of the peti-
tioner's claims were exhausted. Consequently, when the petitioner
files his claim in federal court, that court must also determine
whether the petitioner "fairly presented" his claims to the state
courts. The inability to achieve the goals of comity and efficiency
becomes apparent from the outset. The state court's failure to com-
municate with the federal court in turn causes inefficient expenditure
of federal judicial effort to determine the extent of the state court's
rulings.
C. A Proposal
The background section of this comment will discuss the proce-
dural and substantive history of the Exhaustion Rule. Sections III
and IV will specifically analyze the Vela question of whether the
16. See infra notes 54-126 and accompanying text.
17. 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1983).
18. 464 U.S. 1053 (1984).
19. 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1983).
20. Id. at 957-59.
21. Id. at 957-58.
22. Id. at 960.
23. McKaskle v. Vela, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984).
24. Id. at 1055-56.
25. See infra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
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existence of minor variations in factual pleadings satisfies fair pres-
entation standards, and will conclude that the assumptions and con-
clusions of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Vela should be maintained.
Section IV will also define the proper standard for "fair presenta-
tion" and the terms "claim" and "factual allegations."
In sections V and VI, the author will propose a general reform
of the Exhaustion Rule procedure that parallels the Supreme Court
reform of United States Code Title 28, section 1257 enunciated in
Michigan v, Long." Section 1257 is commonly referred to as the
Independent State Ground doctrine.27 Prior to Long, the Supreme
26. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
27. The doctrine of Independent State Ground generally states that if a state court deci-
sion is based upon independent and adequate state grounds the Supreme Court will not under-
take to review the decision. If, however, the judgment is based on federal grounds, then the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision. The doctrine is a direct result of con-
gressional failure to extend Supreme Court review of state court decisions on questions of state
law. Professor Tribe notes that:
Because the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction, the 'issue
whether a federal question was sufficiently and properly raised in the state
courts is itself ultimately a federal question, as to which [the] Court is not
bound by the decision of the state courts. In resolving this issue, the Court is
engaged in accommodating state interests while always insuring that appropri-
ate consideration will be given to the federal interests involved. Automatically
precluding all Supreme Court review upon a state court's mere recital of proce-
dural grounds would unacceptably endanger the vindication of important federal
rights. The perspective from which the Supreme Court inquires into the 'ade-
quacy' of state procedures which purport to bar its consideration of federal
questions was stated in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi:
"IT]he Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen,
likewise insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities judi-
cially declared and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked.
Even though the claimed constitutional protection be denied on non-federal
grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision of the
state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-33, at 123 (1978) (quoting Lawrence v.
State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 282 (1932). Professor Tribe further notes that ambigu-
ous state court opinions plague the Independent State Ground doctrine in the same manner as
they do habeas corpus procedure:
In many cases, however - especially if the independence and not the adequacy
of the state ground is at stake - the actual inquiry, although it may be difficult,
does not turn on the application of principles of great moment: it may not be
clear from the state court opinion whether the state court saw federal and state
law as independently supporting its decision, or rather took federal law to be
controlling and simply referred to state cases for additional support or
illustration.
Id. at 121.
Prior to the decision in Long, the Supreme Court, at least in Justice O'Connor's view,
made "ad hoc" jurisdictional grants or "vacation and continuance for clarification." See infra
note 134 and accompanying text. After Long the Supreme Court required a "plain statement"
from the state court delineating the basis of its decision. See infra notes 131-37 and accompa-
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Court would not review state court decisions resting on state law so
long as federally protected interests were not threatened and even if
the basis of the state court decision needed clarification, the Court
would decline jurisdiction." Section 1257 jurisdictional issues are
similar to Exhaustion Rule issues in that state court action predi-
cates federal court action. The Long court confronted a similar
problem to that of the Vela court. Due to the absence of a definitive
state court statement regarding the basis, either state or federal, of its
decision, the federal court was simply not certain of that legal foun-
dation. After Long, the Supreme Court required a "plain statement"
by the state courts indicating the basis of their decision.2 9 This com-
ment will, by analogy, propose that the state courts should be
required to define the parameters of their rulings in habeas corpus
proceedings as well. In other words, the exhausted claims should be
clearly indicated. In that way federal/state comity and judicial effi-
ciency will be enhanced by eliminating the need for federal review of
state exhaustion questions.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE EXHAUSTION RULE
A. The Procedural History
The early history of the Exhaustion Rule is dominated by
procedural considerations. The focus was when, and if, exhaustion of
state remedies, would be required. Initially, the Supreme Court de-
lineated a very flexible standard. Over time, however, the "discre-
tionary" animus of court decisions changed to a rigid "total Exhaus-
tion" Rule.80
The traditional starting point for discussing the Exhaustion
Rule is the seminal Supreme Court case of Ex parte Royall.1 First
presented to a district court, the case was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction.8 2 On review, the Supreme Court held that the district court's
jurisdictional holding was erroneous. 8 Instead, the Court found con-
nying text.
28. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
31. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). RoyalU presented his initial habeas corpus relief petition to the
Virginia Circuit Court for the Eastern District. That petition was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. On review, the Supreme Court found concurrent federal/state jurisdiction, but held
that the "public good" required state review prior to federal review absent extenuating circum-
stances. See infra note 36.
32. 117 U.S. at 245.
33. Id. at 248-50.
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current state and federal jurisdiction."' The Court then queried
whether the habeas corpus statute "imperatively require[d] the cir-
cuit court . . . to wrest the petitioner from the custody of the state
officers in advance of his trial in state court?" '' The Court held that
the "public good" required initial claim presentation at the state
level." Citing two earlier Court decisions,"7 the Court delineated the
policy of federal/state comity. Federal "forbearance" should prevail
in order "to give preference to such principles and methods of proce-
dure as shall serve to conciliate the distinct and independent
tribunals of the States and the Union, so that they may cooperate as
harmonious members of a judicial system. ... 88
In addition to the comity policy, a discretionary standard was
inaugurated. A federal court could grant jurisdiction prior to state
exhaustion in two instances. First, "special circumstances requiring
immediate action" are grounds for non-exhaustion. 9 Second, the Su-
preme Court retained jurisdiction during the state appellate
process.' 0
Unlike the comity policy, the Royall standard of flexibility did
not withstand the test of time. Three subsequent Supreme Court
cases mandated state court exhaustion prior to federal review, absent
extenuating circumstances." The last of those decisions, Ex parte
34. Id. at 251-52.
35. Id. at 251.
36.
We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such
means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal
prosecutions commenced in state courts exercising authority within the same
territorial limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation
of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear these cases sum-
marily, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require does not
deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the
powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in light of the
relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribu-
nals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public
good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict be-
tween our courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
constitution.
Id.
37. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884) (As in Taylor the defendant in Covell
instituted an action for replevin. The jurisdictional issue arose because the defendant sought to
invalidate an attachment proceeding based on an alleged improper jurisdictional grant); Taylor
61 U.S. at 595.
38. 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886) (citing Taylor, 61 U.S at 595).
39. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.
40. Id. See also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
41. United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925) (Petitioner made his
initial claim to a federal district court alleging a right to non-exhaustion for extenuating cir-
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Hawk,"2 refashioned the Exhaustion Rule with a sense of finality:
Only after all state remedies available, including all appellate
remedies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ
of certiorari, have been exhausted [will the court entertain a
hearing]. . . . [It is a principle controlling all habeas corpus
petitions to the federal courts, that those courts will interfere
with the administration of justice in the state courts only "in
rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency
are shown to exist.' 4 8
Unlike the Royall decision, there is no mention in Hawke of federal
court intervention in the state appellate process.
Congress took the next step in the procedural history of the
Exhaustion Rule by codifying Hawk. United States Code Title 28,
section 2254 (b) and (c) 44 is "declaratory of existing law as affirmed
by the Supreme Court."46 In other words, Congress would not allow
the federal courts to interrupt the state appellate process either. The
transition from the flexibility of Royall to a more rigid rule was
nearly complete.
The next major habeas corpus procedural determination came
forty years later. In Rose v. Lundy," the Supreme Court considered
a "mixed petition," a petition containing claims that were presented
cumstances, i.e. inability to bear the costs of a state court proceeding. On review, the Supreme
Court ruled that the district court should have dismissed the petition, finding no exceptional
circumstances, no initial state court presentation, and ultimately, lack of discretion on the part
of the district court); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116 (1944) (The petitioner failed to
exhaust state remedies on two counts: 1) by by-passing the state supreme court and/or 2)
failure to employ the common law writ of error coram nobis); Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S.
219 (1943) (Petitioner failed to present his claim to a lower federal court).
42. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
43. Id. at 117 (citations omitted). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The
exhaustion requirement refers only to a failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the
applicant at the time he files the application.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948) provides in pertinent part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.
Id.
45. Id.
46. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
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to the lower court, and claims that were not. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition, refusing to review the exhausted and
unexhausted claims alike."7 Prior to that decision, most courts either
reviewed the entire petition or dismissed only* the non-exhausted
claims.' 8
The plurality decision in Rose by Justice O'Connor sought to
"protect the state court's role in enforcement of federal law and pre-
vent disruption of state judicial proceedings."' 49 The decision also
highlighted two principle effects that would be maintained. First,
state courts would retain the initial opportunity to review all claims
of constitutional error,"' and an "equally important" second effect,
that claims would "more often be accompanied by a complete factual
record to aid the Federal courts in their review.""' Justice O'Connor
referred to that outlined process as "total exhaustion."8 2 The transi-
tion was now complete. Originally, federal/state "harmony"
required initial state presentation and federal court discretion. The
Rose decision extinguished that flexibility. Federal/state comity and
efficiency now mandated, not merely suggested, total exhaustion. In
sum, the spirit of Royall is nowhere to be found in Rose.
B. The Substantive History of the Exhaustion Rule
In contrast to the early history of the Exhaustion Rule which
focused on procedural issues, recent Exhaustion Rule history is dom-
inated by substantive questions. Most procedural questions were
answered. Unless and until state presentation was made, the peti-
tioner could not avail himself of federal jurisdiction absent extenuat-
ing circumstances." The next logical question is what constitutes
state presentation.
47. Id. at 522.
48. For circuit court cases formally upholding mixed petitions, see Miller v. Hall, 536
F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Levy v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1968); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Meyers, 372 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1967); Hewett v. North
Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); Ware v. Gagnon, 659 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1981);
Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d
348, reh'g denied, 587 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807
(9th Cir. 1976).
49. 455 U.S. at 518.
50. Id. at 518-19.
51. Id. at 519.
52. Id. at 522.
53. See supra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
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1. Elements of State Presentation
Picard v. Conner' contains the standards most often cited for
fair presentation. In Picard, the petitioner presented an invalid in-
dictment claim at the state level." At the federal level, he changed
his claim to "unconstitutional discrimination.""' The federal court
ruled that because a completely new claim was introduced at the
federal level, the fair presentation standard was not satisfied.' That
standard was characterized in four ways. The federal claim must be
either "fairly presented,"" or the "substantial equivalent" of the
state court claim."' The state court must also have a "fair opportu-
nity to consider the claim"' or the "opportunity to apply [the same]
controlling legal principles to the facts."' 1 The Picard court's hold-
ing indicated that presentation of a completely different claim to the
federal courts does not constitute fair presentation. However, the
court stated that in its view, fair presentation was possible "despite
variations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its
support."' 2
The guidelines set out in Picard have proven difficult to apply.
The courts have had the most difficulty in determining what the pe-
titioner's claim is, as opposed to what facts are urged in its support.
That difficulty is a result of imprecise definitions of "claim" and
"factual allegation." Often the use of the terms claims and facts is
not consistent from one case to the next." Therefore, in order to
avoid the same confusion throughout the rest of this comment, claims
will be termed "major premises" and factual allegations will be
termed "minor premises."'
In practical terms, the major premise (claim) at the state level
in the Picard case was invalid indictment. The petitioner's minor
premises (facts urged in support of the major premise) were
improper identification process and failure to submit a judicial deter-
54. 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
55. Conner v. Picard, 434 F.2d 673, 674 (1st Cir. 1970).
56. 404 U.S. at 278.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 275.
59. Id. at 278.
60. Id. at 276.
61. Id. at 275 (citing Conner v. Picard, 434 F.2d at 674).
62. Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. at 277 [emphasis added].
63. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
64. The problem of imprecise definitions for "claim" and "fact" in habeas corpus proce-
dure is the same definitional problem confronted by courts concerned with the res judicata and
pleading forms issue. See generally GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1979).
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mination of criminality."6 At the federal level, only the major pre-
mise changed from invalid indictment to unconstitutional
discrimination.
2. Four Variations
Habeas corpus procedure is complicated by the fact that peti-
tions, as in Picard, are often changed between state and federal
levels." If exact copies of petitions were presented at each level there
would be few problems, if any. But expectations of photo-copy peti-
tioning are impractical. 7 Therefore, given that there are two
elements to a petition, major and minor premises, a petition could be
varied in four basic ways between the state and federal level. First, a
new major premise could be included in the petition, as in Picard.
Second, minor premises or factual allegations outside the state court
record could be presented at the federal level." Third, the major
premise could be enlarged or augmented," and fourth, minor prem-
ises or factual allegations contained in the state court record could be
pled for the first time at the federal level.7" The balance of this
comment is devoted to briefly sketching case law on the first three
variations for point of reference and to broadly discussing the final
variation.
a. New or Different Major Premises
Presentation of a new major premise at the federal level has met
universal judicial disapproval.7 1 In Mayer v. Moeykens,72 an insuffi-
cient arrest warrant major premise was declared different from a
lack of probable cause major premise. As a result, the petition was
remanded. Likewise, the court in Turner v. Fair73 ruled that a sixth
amendment confrontation clause major premise did not include the
additional major premises that: 1) the proposed cross-examination
65. 434 F.2d at 674-75.
66. Id.
67. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 80-139 and accompanying text.
71. The following cases offer a more complete treatment of the New or Different Major
Premise variation: Meegs v. Fair, 620 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1980); Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 991
(2d Cir. 1974); Coxson v. Oliver, 392 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1975); Statewright v. State of
Florida, 394 F. Supp. 849 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Webster v. Frey, 665 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1981);
Stranghoener v. Black, 720 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
72. 494 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974).
73. 617 F.2d 7 (lst Cir. 1980).
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would have impeached the witness; and 2) that the witness knew
material information regarding the crime. In short, each major pre-
mise which a petitioner seeks to adjudicate must be initially
presented at the state level.
b. New or Augmented Minor Premises
The second variation is the presentation at the federal level of
minor premises outside the state court record. That situation arises
more often than not because the petitioner has undertaken discovery
subsequent to his state court presentation. District courts unani-
mously hold that when a "habeas corpus petitioner [who] has previ-
ously presented his claim to the state court, [then] presents additional
facts to federal court which materially alter the claim or crucially
affect its determination, the petitioner must present this evidence to
state court before the federal court can entertain his petition. '7 4
In sum, federal jurisdiction will not be granted if the factual
record presented at the federal level is materially different from that
presented at the state level. Any material subsequent discovery by
the petitioner must be presented at the state level first.
c. Enlarged or Augmented Major Premises
The first two variation categories involve wholesale changes in
pleadings. The final two concern only minor changes. In general, a
major premise is enlarged either by combining several minor prem-
ises into a single major premise or by claiming interrelation between
major premises.
Federal courts have consistently denied jurisdiction to petition-
ers who have combined minor premises into a single major
premise. 7' The courts hold that "presentation of factual data without
the articulation of the substance or substantial equivalent of the legal
argument thereby supported does not satisfy the exhaustion
requirement. ''7 8
74. Allah v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp. 282, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Anderson v.
Cassales, 531 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1976)). The following cases offer a more complete treat-
ment of the New or Augmented Minor Premises variation: Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192,
1197 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1979); Schiers v. Cali-
fornia, 333 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964); Jones v. Hess, 681 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1982); Stevens v.
Zant, 580 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
75. Daye v. Attorney General of New York, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); Dougan v. Ponte, 727 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1984).
76. Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 1982).
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Petitioners claiming major premise interrelation have had
mixed results. The decision in Rose v. Lundy" overturned a district
court decision which considered exhausted claims for relief inter-
twined and interrelated with unexhausted claims. The Supreme
.Court refused to set forth guidelines to distinguish interrelated prem-
ises, and held that "[rlequiring dismissal of petitions containing both
exhausted and unexhausted claims will relieve the district courts of
the difficult if not impossible task of deciding when claims are re-
lated, and will reduce the temptation to consider unexhausted
claims. 178
The Rose holding appears to dictate dismissal of augmented
major premises. Nevertheless, a federal district court held subsequent
to Rose that where "[tlhe two issues were so factually and logically
related that the raising of the one afforded the state courts an oppor-
tunity to consider both, [the petition may stand]."79
III. VELA V. ESTELLE AND JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
FROM DENIAL OF CERTIORARI
The least settled variation of the four categories, and the one
which gives rise to this comment, is the newly pled fact allegation.
That situation arises when the petitioner raises minor premises at
the federal level, extant in the state court record, but not specifically
pled at the state level. Vela v. Estelle8" is an example of such varia-
tion. It also highlights the twin problems of imprecise definitions and
ambiguous state court rulings.
A. The Facts of Vela
In Vela v. Estelle,8" the federal court was presented with an
"ineffective assistance of counsel" claim, the same major premise
presented to the state courts."' The factual record was also identical
at each level. 88 However, the petitioner changed his pleadings at the
federal level by augmenting his list of factual allegations in support
77. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
78. Id. at 519.
79. Williams, 691 F.2d at 8 (referring to Fillippini v. Ristaino, 585 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir.
1978)). The Williams court declared that consideration of a claim that the petitioner had
waived her constitutional rights of silence necessarily involved court consideration of the bur-
den of proof of waiver, i.e., the related theory.
80. 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 960.
83. Id. at 957-58.
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of his major premise.84 At the state court level, the minor premise
list was: 1) failure to properly object to prejudicial character testi-
mony, 2) failure to properly object to testimony, and 3) failure to
properly object to the state's closing argument. At the federal level,
the list was enlarged to include: 4) failure to properly prepare the
defendant for a guilty plea, 5) failure to stipulate to evidence, and 6)
inadequate summation performance.88
The Fifth Circuit determined that the obligation of the state
court was to carry out an independent analysis of the mixed fact and
law claim (ineffective assistance of counsel) and determine whether
by the totality of the circumstances, the assistance was effective. 8, In
other words, the minor premises urged by the petitioner were merely
"highlights" of the claim to be considered by the state court in mak-
ing its own analysis.87 If the state court fulfilled that role, which as a
matter of comity should be assumed, then the federal court could
consider the claim exhausted.'
Recall that Picard defined "fair presentation" to include "vari-
ations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its sup-
port."' 9 It should also be recalled that Rose desired complete factual
records for federal review. 90 Perhaps with those cases in mind the
Fifth Circuit in Vela held that where all minor premises alleging
ineffective assistance at the federal level were contained in the state
court record, the petitioner exhausted his state remedies. 1
It would appear that the Vela court complied with Rose by re-
viewing a complete factual record. The court also complied with Pic-
ard inasmuch as variations of the factual allegations urged in sup-
port of a major premise are allowed. Several cases have followed the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 959-60. For cases supporting the view that an ineffective assistance claim is a
mixed question of fact and law, see Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1979); Arm-
stead v. Maggie, 720 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Shaw v. De Robertis, 755
F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1985). For cases supporting the view that a review of the entire record is
necessary to determine if the assistance was effective in totality, see Washington v. Strickland,
693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1982); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981); Payne
v. Janasz, 711 F.2d 1305, 1310 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 712
(7th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel Kowal v. Attorney General, 550 F. Supp. 447, 455 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); Pickens v. Lochart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1460 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982); Fuedler v. Goldsmith,
728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gibbs, 662 F.2d 728 (1 1th Cir. 1981); Good-
win v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir. 1982).
87. 708 F.2d at 960.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
91. 708 F.2d at 960.
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Vela standard of review,'92 but not all courts concur."3 Prior to dis-
cussing that disagreement, however, the logic behind the Vela deci-
sion should be reviewed.
B. The Logic of Vela
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Vela is a throwback to the spirit of
Royall, written without apparent deference to the Exhaustion Rule's
recent restrictive history. The court declared that "[e]xhaustion is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite, but derives from considerations of com-
ity between the state and federal judicial systems . . . [and] [tjhe
rule that a state prisoner is required to exhaust his state remedies
before he applies for federal habeas relief is not graven in stone.
' 94
Vela's federal petition contained "the three central errors urged
in his state habeas petition," 5 and an additional series of lesser mi-
nor premises. After noting that difference, the court prefaced its
analysis by recanting the familiar themes of Exhaustion Rule policy,
initial state court presentation and minimal friction.'
The next, and most important, aspect of the Fifth Circuit's
analysis is that major premises and minor premises are defined as
distinct entities. The court stated that the "exhaustion requirement is
not satisfied if a petitioner presents new legal theories [major prem-
ises] or entirely new factual claims [minor premises] in his petition to
the federal court. ' '" 7
In support thereof, the Vela court cited several cases where the
state factual record was supplemented prior to federal presentation,
and concluded that in those cases the "state remedies may not be
considered exhausted." 98 However, in Vela the court found that:
[A IU the instances of ineffective assistance alleged in Vela's
92. Rodriguez v. McKaskle, 724 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 520
(1984); Brand v. Lewis, 784 F.2d 1515 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (failure to enumerate all instances of
attorney error does preclude appellate review); Willis v. Newsome, 771 F.2d 1455 (11 th Cir.
1985) (per curiam) (petitioner exhausted his state remedies even though his appellate petition
contained an additional allegation of ineffective assistance).
93. McKaskle v. Vela, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984); Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190
(11th Cir. 1983).
94. 708 F.2d at 958 (citing Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1982); Galtieri v.
Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1978); Minor v. Lucas, 697 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.
1983)).
95. 708 F.2d at 957.
96. Id. at 958.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 958-59 (citing Brown v. Estelle, 702 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also
Burns v. Estelle, 695 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1983); Hart v. Estelle, 634 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1981);
Knoxson v. Estelle, 574 F.2d 1339 (5th Cir. 1978).
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supplemental brief to this Court were contained in the trial rec-
ord reviewed by the state habeas court when it denied Vela's
original petition. This petition argued ineffective assistance on
the basis of counsel's entire performance. The petition cited the
entire record below, singling out for comment certain strikingly
prejudicial errors.""
In other words, minor premises should be considered mere
"highlights"100 which support a major premise. Further, in an inef-
fective assistance claim, the "counsel's performance is to be evaluated
on the basis of 'the totality of the circumstances in the entire rec-
ord.' ' 0' In Vela both state and federal court opinions clearly
indicate that the entire record was reviewed. 0' Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that:
[Allthough Vela has highlighted in his brief to this Court a
number of trial errors that were not specifically mentioned in
his pro se state habeas petition, all of these errors support the
same constitutional claim urged before the state court, and all
were readily discernable from the review of the entire record
which that court was obligated to carry out.' 03
Summarily, the court determined that the alleged new facts
were not new at all, and that its consideration of those same facts
would not create friction between the federal and state courts. 41
Quite to the contrary, the court implied that friction would result if
it dismissed the petition by stating that "[ciharacterizing these allega-
tions as 'unexhausted claims' would require us to find that the state
habeas court failed in its duty to evaluate counsel's performance on
the basis of the record as a whole. This we are not willing to do."1 '
However, at least three Supreme Court Justices were willing to find
that the state court failed to evaluate the entire record.10 6
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissent From Denial of Certiorari
The Vela fair presentation finding was appealed by the state of
99. 708 F.2d at 959 (emphasis original).
100. Id. at 960.
101. Id. at 959 (quoting Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1355 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982) (emphasis original)). See infra note 86.
102. 708 F.2d at 959.
103. Id. at 960.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. McKaskle v. Vela, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984).
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Texas to the Supreme Court but was denied certiorari. 1 " Justice
O'Connor's dissent from that denial opens by stating that the consid-
eration of factual allegations not specifically raised in the state court
"undermines the policies" behind the exhaustion requirement. 0'°
Citing the familiar concerns of comity, minimal friction between
state and federal courts and fair presentation, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that pursuant to Rose, unspecified allegations cannot be
considered as "fairly presented" 1°9 and that state court evaluation
"of the entire record cannot mean that the exhaustion requirement is
satisfied."1 o
In Rose v. Lundy we said that an exhausted claim could not be
considered by a federal habeas court if the claim depended in
part on another claim not raised in the state courts, even if the
state courts, in rejecting the exhausted claim, had reviewed the
entire record. The exhaustion rule requires that the substance of
a federal habeas corpus claim first be presented to the state
courts, Picard v. Conner, and the substance of an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim is identified by the list of alleged er-
rors committed by counsel. Domaingue v. Butterworth.""
Justice O'Connor concludes by stating that the "potential for inter-
ference with the relations of state and federal courts" requires that
"unless state courts have been pointed to a particular error of coun-
sel, a claim based upon that error is unexhausted."'
D. Analysis
Justice O'Connor's dissent points out the two serious problems
plaguing the transfer of jurisdiction from state to the federal level in
habeas corpus procedure. First, there is no single fair presentation
standard nor accepted definitions of major and minor premises. Sec-
ond, it is often unclear from state court opinions which claims were
exhausted.
Justice O'Connor's dissent almost uniformly confuses major
premises for minor premises. The three leading cases she cites, Rose,
Picard, and Domaingue, dealt with major premise questions. The
Rose court dismissed a petition with exhausted and unexhausted ma-
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1054.
109. Id. at 1054-55.
110. Id. at 1055.
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. Id.
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jor premises.1 13 The Picard court remanded a petition containing a
different major premise than was presented at the state level.' 1 4
Neither of those cases is dispositive of the Vela question of whether
minor premise variations based on identical state and federal records,
satisfies fair presentation standards.
Justice O'Connor also states that Domaingue v. Butterworth"5
stands for the proposition that "the substance of an ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel claim is identified by the list of alleged errors
committed by counsel.""' Nowhere in Domaingue is that even inti-
mated. Additionally, the Domaingue petition was dismissed because
it depended "in large measure on factual allegations outside the rec-
ord on direct appeal to state courts, '"1 7 i.e. new facts, not because
minor premises were newly pled at the federal level. Domaingue is
simply not dispositive of the Vela question. As a result, the Vela
question remains unanswered. More importantly, Justice
O'Connor's continuing disagreement with the Fifth Circuit over the
proper standard for fair presentation and definitions of claim and
factual allegation leaves those issues unresolved.
IV. ON INEFFICIENCY AND COMITY
A. A Question of Policy
1. The Proper Definitions
Exhaustion Rule policy has been dominated by two concerns:
federal/state comity and judicial economy. The set standard for fair
presentation and definitions of claim and factual allegation, as well
as the disposition of the Vela question, should depend upon how the
Supreme Court views the policies of comity and efficiency.
2. Judicial Efficiency
Three parties are directly interested in the efficiency of habeas
corpus cases: the state and federal judges hearing the petition, the
prosecutor seeking a conviction, and the petitioner in search of his
freedom."' If, as Justice O'Connor claims in her dissent,
"[ilneffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are becoming as much a
113. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510. See supra notes 77-78 ,and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
115. 641 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1981).
116. Vela, 464 U.S. at 1055.
117. 641 F.2d at 13.
118. Rose, 455 U.S. at 532.
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part of state and federal habeas corpus proceedings as the bailiff's
call to order in those courts,""19 then the ultimate concern of the
judges who hear those cases must be efficiency. Or, as stated by
Justice Stevens, it must be the "authority . . . to administer their
calendars effectively."' 20 It makes little sense to have those judges
dismiss a valid claim because of minor variations in the pleadings. In
Rose, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion decried the dismissal of the
petition (containing additional major premises), stating that the case
was "destined to return to the federal District Court and the Court
of Appeals . . . [and that] [tlhe additional proceedings that the
Court requires before considering the merits will be totally
unproductive."1
2 1
Justice Stevens felt that even if the additional claim was frivo-
lous, the remainder of the petition would find its way back to the
same federal court that dismissed the mixed petition, thereby wasting
the time of each court along the way back. If that argument is of any
merit, dismissing the Vela petition would be a complete waste of
prosecutorial and judicial resources. Carried to its logical extreme,
Justice O'Connor's dissent would require the dismissal of a federal
petition containing one hundred and one minor premises because
that same petition contained only one hundred premises at the state
level. Would not the state court hear the additional allegation (a fact
it probably considered when it reviewed the entire record initially)
and rule the same as it had before. As a result, the petitioner would
again find himself in federal court, wasting time and taxpayer dol-
lars. Under Justice O'Connor's guidelines, federal jurisdiction would
be granted only upon submission of a photocopy of the state peti-
tions. Further, as the Vela Court pointed out, dismissal of petitions
on trivial grounds could hamper, not enhance, federal/state
comity. 1"
As far as the petitioner is concerned, Justice O'Connor's guide-
lines probably produce endless and "needless procedural hurdles,"128
rather than the right to a speedy trial. Justice Stevens' dissent in
Rose points out that many petitions are filed pro se,' 2" and later
changed by an attorney at the appellate level. As a matter of practi-
cality, the Court cannot expect identical petitioning. According to
119. 464 U.S. at 1056.
120. Rose, 455 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
123. Rose, 455 U.S. at 550.
124. Id. at 546 n.15.
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Justice Stevens, "[g]iven the ambiguity of many habeas corpus appli-
cations filed by pro se applicants, such differing appraisals should
not be uncommon." 125 There results enormous potential for disa-
greement at each court level over whether the Exhaustion Rule was
satisfied.
In summation, it simply does not follow that the dismissal of a
petition, due to the addition of a previously reviewed allegation, is
efficient. In fact, it is patently inefficient. Therefore, the definition of
fair presentation should not exclude minor premise variation, as in
Vela, at the federal level. 1' Further, the definition of claims should
be legal theory as suggested by the Vela court.'"" The definition of
factual allegations as the minor premises urged in support of the
claim should also be used as suggested by the Vela court.'28 Those
definitions support the dismissal of the presentation on new claims at
the federal level as in Rose. They also avoid Justice O'Connor's con-
fusion in her dissent and ultimately support the decision not to dis-
miss minor variations in factual pleadings. The new found clarity
those definitions provide would enhance federal/state comity.
3. The Need for Clarity
The solution to problematic imprecise state court opinions
should be directed by comity and efficiency policy concerns as well.
Unfortunately, few cases discuss the need for state court clarity re-
garding exhaustion. Justice O'Connor time and again calls for "fair
presentation" but declines to acknowledge that the state court ruling
on Vela's petition all but stated that fair presentation was made.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Rose decried the state court's fail-
ure to "specif[y] which allegations of prosecutorial misconduct it
considered.' 29
In each case addressed thus far, the federal courts spent endless
hours attempting to determine whether state court exhaustion was
125. Id.
126. If a prisoner used such a standard to reach the federal court prematurely, and
thereby avoided an unfavorable state court, his petition would be subject to HABEAS CORPUS
RULE 9(b) which provides that:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it failed
to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on
the merits or, if the new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that
the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted
an abuse of the writ.
127. See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. 455 U.S. at 532.
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effected. It is manifest that the state courts could end those inquiries
by simply stating which major premises and/or minor premises were
exhausted. Thus, federal courts would no longer need to inquire into
whether exhaustion occurred, unless a gross dereliction is apparent.
The Exhaustion Rule's efficiency and comity policy concerns would
be best served if prior to granting jurisdiction, the federal courts re-
quired a "plain statement" from state courts that delineates the pa-
rameters of their rulings. The recent Supreme Court case of Michi-
gan v. Long 80 supports such a solution.
V. MICHIGAN V. LONG, VELA AND JUSTICE O'CONNOR
A. The Parallel
In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court was faced with an
identical problem in a separate area of federal judiciary procedure,
United States Code Title 28, section 1257. " ' Pursuant to that sec-
tion, if a state court decision is based upon independent state
grounds, the Supreme Court will not undertake to review the deci-
sion. If the judgment is based on federal grounds, then the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to review the decision. " 3
In Long, the state court did not declare the grounds upon which
it based its ruling.' 8 The parallel to the Exhaustion Rule dilemma
is striking. The federal Court was not sure whether federal jurisdic-
tional requirements were met.
According to the Long Court, the imprecise state court opinion
130. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
131. Id.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of the State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or im-
munity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes
of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
For the purpose of this section, the term "highest court of the State" in-
cludes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
133. 463 U.S. at 1043-44.
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and others like it have raised two concerns:
[1] [The] ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve pos-
sible . . independent state grounds is antithetical to the doctri-
nal consistency that is required when sensitive issues offederal-
state relations are involved. . . [and] [2] [vlacation and contin-
uance for clarification have . . . been unsatisfactory both be-
cause of the delay and decrease in efficiency of judicial
administration." 4
Those concerns mirror the dual policy concerns of the Exhaustion
Rule: comity and efficiency.
The Long court ultimately held that "[i]f the state court deci-
sion indicates clearly and expressly that it is . . . based on . . .
independent grounds, we of course, will not undertake to review the
decision."' 5 Further, if the state court makes "clear by a plain state-
ment" that the federal cases considered were used solely for guid-
ance, then federal review will not be undertaken. "' If no statement
is made, and the state ground is not "clear from the face of the opin-
ion," then the federal ground will be assumed.187 "In this way, both
justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved."' 8
What is most astonishing about the Long opinion, other than
the simplicity of its solution, is that Justice O'Connor wrote the
opinion in direct contradiction to her dissent from denial of certiorari
in Vela.
B. On Logical Consistency
The source of ambiguity in both Long and Vela is identical:
imprecise state opinions. Resulting uncertainty, in turn, raises con-
cerns regarding federal/state comity and judicial efficiency. In both
cases, numerous judicial decisions have struggled to arrive at a defin-
itive resolution.
In Long, the Supreme Court held that ambiguity would no
longer be the order of the day. Furthermore, "vacation and continu-
ance for clarification" was not the solution to resolving ambigui-
ties.'3 9 Instead, judicial efficiency and federal/state comity demand a
''plain statement," defining the parameters of state courts'
134. Id. at 1039-40 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 1041 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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decisions. 4
Justice O'Connor abandons that logic, however, with regard to
the Vela question. Although the problem source and the effects
thereof are the same, the solution apparently is not. In Long, the
Court rejected the option of remanding the cases to the state court
level. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor advocates precisely that with
regard to Vela. There is no obvious reason for that logical inconsis-
tency. The solution to both problems should be the same.
VI. THE PROPOSAL
The solution to the problems affecting Exhaustion Rule proce-
dure is exactly parallel to the Long solution. "If the state court
decision indicates clearly and expressly" that X major premise and
all minor premises in support thereof were exhausted, the federal
court should not review that question (unless gross dereliction can be
shown). If it "is not clear from the face of the opinion," then the
federal court should take a narrow view, adjudge only the premise
upon which the state court reached the merits as exhausted, and dis-
miss the remainder of the petition.
A. Efficiency
State court declarations regarding exhaustion would be more ef-
ficient than federal court reviews. Only where challenged should
federal courts address the question of whether state remedies were
exhausted. State efficiency will be served, if and only if, the states
exhaust the claim and clearly indicate which claim was exhausted. If
the state court does not do that, it runs the risk of having to re-
review the case after federal dismissal. Plainly stated, the state courts
in most cases would be able to effect the outcome of the exhaustion
issue in the federal courts. Therefore, they would have an incentive
to fully exhaust the petitioner's claim the first time around.
B. Comity
The proposed solution directly addresses the comity issue. The
jurisdictional transfer from state to federal court will no longer be
subject to uncertainty. The federal court will not be heavy-handed
by either dismissing too many cases or reviewing too many cases. In
fact, federal court action will be dictated in part by state court action.
In sum, potential federal/state friction will be greatly reduced where
140. Id.
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the rules are defined in advance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Habeas corpus procedure has a long, tangled history in the
United States. Definitive answers have been less frequent than "ad
hoc" decisions. The Vela question, of whether minor premise varia-
tions based on identical state and federal court records, however,
offers an excellent opportunity to make a logically consistent
resolution.
Federal/state comity and judicial efficiency concerns dominate
habeas corpus procedure. Those concerns are frustrated by ambigu-
ity. Ambiguous state court opinions and imprecise definitions of
critical federal habeas corpus procedural terms can and should be
resolved.
The proper standard of fair presentation should allow minor
premise variation. The proper definition of claim should be major
legal theory and the proper definition of factual allegations should be
minor premises urged in support of a major legal theory.
Application of the Long solution to habeas corpus procedure is
both logically consistent and efficient. A plain statement delineating
the parameters of the state court holding will eliminate the need to
review state decisions on the exhaustion issue in most cases. In turn,
federal/state comity and judicial efficiency will be greatly enhanced.
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